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Peer review is a cornerstone of modern scientific endeavor. However, there is grow-
ing consensus that several limitations of the current peer review system, from lack of
incentives to reviewers to lack of transparency, risks to undermine its benefits. Here,
we introduce the PRINCIPIAab framework for peer-review of scientific outputs (e.g.,
papers, grant proposals or patents). The framework allows key players of the scientific
ecosystem – including existing publishing groups – to create and manage peer-reviewed
journals, by building a free market for reviews and publications. PRINCIPIA’s referees
are transparently rewarded according to their efforts and the quality of their reviews.
PRINCIPIA also naturally allows to recognize the prestige of users and journals, with
an intrinsic reputation system that does not depend on third-parties. PRINCIPIA re-
balances the power between researchers and publishers, stimulates valuable assessments
from referees, favors a fair competition between journals, and reduces the costs to access
research output and to publish.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Peer review is the practice of evaluating scientific out-
put by experts in the relevant domain of knowledge. It
provides a validation mechanism that is crucial to reduce
the likelihood of publishing misleading results or false
claims, adding value to scientific output. The impact of
peer-review is pivotal at all scales of the scientific pro-
cess. It can affect academic careers, and – through top
journals and funding agencies – it might drive the rise or
fall of academic trends or even research fields.
Despite its crucial role, the current peer review comes
with many disadvantages that make it a highly debated
matter across decades (Culliton, 1996; Editorial, 2003;
Tennant et al., 2017; Editorial, 2019a). A remarkable
example is the public criticism to funding decisions of
the National Science Foundation, leading to a statistical
analysis of the underlying evaluative procedures which
showed no significant evidence of impact on funding (Cole
et al., 1977).
Rationalizing peer review is challenging: the work of
reviewers is essentially based on voluntary contribution
with virtually no incentives to report’s quality. At the
same time, academic publishing is a tremendously prof-
itable business where the workforce 1) produces valuable
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2content for free, 2) performs valuable tasks without any
reward and 3) guarantees a constant demand. In fact,
the whole peer-review system induces a social dilemma
at the individual level that is barely balanced by cur-
rent incentives, such as the journal impact factor. Why
should peers cooperate for the public good benefits? Why
should they do it, if their work is done without rewards
while publishers take all benefits, e.g., from subscriptions
or open access policies? Why authors should be fair or
produce high-quality scientific output if their peers might
opt for not cooperating?
Any rational answer to such questions would lead to
sub-optimal individual decisions, resulting in an unreli-
able scientific ecosystem and a tragedy of the commons.
However, decades of results from behavioral organization
and decision theory, experimental economics and survey
research show that rationality is very often far from be-
ing a good model of human behavior (Loomes and Sug-
den, 1982; Simon, 1986; Tversky and Kahneman, 1989;
Arthur, 1994; Simon, 1995; Kahneman, 2003).
Some studies have shown that increased public good
benefits, together with editorial decisions accounting
for reputational information (reputation bias), can help
the evolution of high-quality contributions from authors
while reviewers still lack the right incentives (Righi and
Takács, 2017). It is emblematic the provocative study by
Campanario about the unreasonable resistance encoun-
tered by some studies – among the most-cited articles of
all times – during peer review (Campanario, 1996).
Nevertheless, peer-review is still perceived by all key
players, from authors to publishers, as an effective way to
improve the quality of a manuscript by means of a collec-
tive effort, opposed to isolated ones by few authoritative
individuals. In fact, knowledge becomes scientific only
when the community reaches a consensus on it by means
of academic scrutiny, refinement and validation (Edito-
rial, 2019a).
A. State of peer review
The potential disadvantages of peer review have been
widely discussed for decades. In 1982, 12 articles – pub-
lished by academics from prestigious and highly pro-
ductive American psychology departments in highly re-
garded American psychology journals – where resubmit-
ted to the same journals which previously published them
18 to 32 months earlier, after changing authors and their
affiliations. The result was that 9 out of 12 submis-
sions were not recognized as resubmissions, while 8 out
9 those studies were rejected because of serious method-
ological flaws (Blissett, 1982). A study similar in spirit,
one decade after, highlighted the same absence of reli-
ability in peer review of medical research (Ernst et al.,
1993).
Research interest on peer review has recently in-
creased, yet the field remains fragmented across differ-
ent research communities (Grimaldo et al., 2018). The
Global State of Peer Review report for 2013–20171, pub-
lished by a platform helping academics to track and
recognize their contributions to the scientific endeavor,
has highlighted that such contributions are unevenly dis-
tributed across countries and institutions. Scholars in
leading science countries, such as the United States and
Japan, write 2 reviews per each of their submitted arti-
cles, against the 0.6 written by their colleagues in emerg-
ing countries such as China and Poland. Moreover, the
latter tend to accept more frequently peer review requests
and complete them faster than the former ones, although
their reviews are on average shorter than the ones from
scholars in wealthy locations. According to the same re-
port, reviewers spend globally about 68.5 million hours
each year, providing short reviews (477 words on aver-
age) within 16.4 days (median value): surprisingly, 10%
of reviewers account for 50% of peer reviews, and 75%
of editors claim the hardest part of their job is finding
willing reviewers. It seems that for 41% scholars, peer
review is part of their job, although 71% of researchers
have to decline review requests because the article is not
within their area of expertise and 42% declare to be too
busy.
The excessive academic burdening, the lack of train-
ing in reviewing and the excessive number of requests,
coupled to potential human biases, might lead to poor
reviews which fail to prevent the publication of stud-
ies that do not deserve consideration from the academic
community (Editorial, 2019b). One possible source of bi-
ases in the peer-review process resides in the connections
– such as co-authorship – between creators and evalua-
tors of scientific work. Interestingly, even belonging to
different professional networks, or “schools of thought”,
might lead to substantive disagreements between scien-
tists in the peer-review process (Teplitskiy et al., 2018).
One possible solution to this issue could be the adop-
tion of “double-blind” peer-review, in which reviewers are
not aware of the names and affiliations of paper authors,
as opposed to the “single-blind” system in which only
names of reviewers are hidden. For papers submitted
to computer science conferences, single-blind reviewers
have been showed to be significantly more likely than
their double-blind counterparts to recommend for accep-
tance papers from famous authors, top universities, and
top companies (Tomkins et al., 2017).
Even editors, as humans, tend to take decisions that
might be affected by their current burdening, resulting
into an overall peer review system with more disadvan-
tages than advantages, and a scientific ecosystem sup-
ported by wrong incentives. It is emblematic the lack
1 https://publons.com/community/gspr
3of policies to recognize researchers for the production of
valuable data set – even if the trend is slowly chang-
ing (Gorgolewski et al., 2013) – and for reproducibility
studies, resulting in movements against “data lechers” –
researchers who use data produced and shared by other
colleagues – and in defining research parasitism as a treat
to science (Longo and Drazen, 2016). In reality, these
collateral effects might be a treat only to selfish indi-
viduals, whereas the whole collectivity can only benefit
from reproducibility and replicability to advance human
knowledge (Bergstrom, 2016; Greene et al., 2017; Edito-
rial, 2018a; Teytelman, 2018). Recent quantitative evi-
dence from neuroscience supports this argument (Milham
et al., 2018).
It is clear how concerns related to peer review reflect
more general issues affecting the scientific ecosystem.
Note that, despite all limitations, peer-review scores to
grant applications have been showed to be at least par-
tially predictive of the success of funded projects, quan-
tified by their total time-adjusted citation output, while
the amount of funds awarded per application is not (Gallo
et al., 2014). Therefore, improving the peer-review pro-
cess also will ultimately impact the allocation of billions
of dollars in research funds. As we will see, opening the
whole peer review process, and making it transparent to
anyone, might only improve the current state of the art.
Remarkably, high-reputation journals and research com-
munities are already recognizing data sharing as part of
the scientific process, requiring access to data used in ar-
ticles they publish (Taichman et al., 2016; McNutt et al.,
2016; Gewin, 2016; Editorial, 2018b).
Similarly, it seems plausible to think that opening the
peer-review system – in a way that accounts for poten-
tial human biases and findings from behavioral sciences,
game theory and complexity science – might be the right
way to go. Other potential benefits of opening the pro-
cess include valuable examples for early-career academics
and the availability of huge databases which might be an-
alyzed by scientists to identify potential biases and pro-
pose methods to eradicate them.
B. Variants and alternatives
Since 2008 the American Physical Society recognizes
its outstanding referees for their work2 and, more re-
cently, Elsevier3 and Nature Publishing Group (Edito-
rial, 2019c) are adopting similar strategies.
Some initiatives have experimented novel and alterna-
tive schemes for peer review, from publishing reports4
2 https://journals.aps.org/OutstandingReferees
3 https://www.elsevier.com/reviewers-update/story/innovation-
in-publishing/elseviers-peer-review-innovations-aim-to-support-
science-and-reward-reviewers
4 For instance: Biology Direct (2006), The EMBO Journal (2009),
– i.e., the content of the review – and reviewers’ iden-
tity (Editorial, 2018c) – i.e., the names of reviewers –
to crowd-based approaches (List, 2017). In the latter,
manuscripts are made available by editors and the crowd
is given a certain amount of time to respond. Surpris-
ingly, each paper received several comments – even in
details buried in supplementary material and support-
ing information – considered informative by editors and
allowing for a rapid editorial response. Quantitatively,
the crowd responded much faster (days versus months)
and provided more-comprehensive collective feedbacks,
appreciated by authors (Editorial, 2019a).
Other initiatives like the one by the journal eLife, sim-
ilar in spirit, obtained a good response to pilot projects
from the research community, while measuring higher ac-
ceptance rates for late-career researchers compared to
their early- and mid-career colleagues5. The European
Journal of Neuroscience reported that transparent re-
view at the end of 2016 led to better and faster reports6.
Nevertheless, researchers from different disciplines are
responding differently, with more than 70% in Evolu-
tion and Ecology opting for publishing reports when the
choice is given, against the 50% in Physics (Editorial,
2016). A group of biologists built an online platform to
keep track of this type of experiments, providing a direct
way to compare trials with respect to multiple criteria 7.
A common factor is transparency in peer-review re-
ports, which could avoid superficial reviews or too harsh
tone either from referees or from authors. By opening the
review process, it is also possible to avoid abuses from
editors and predatory behavior from publishers (e.g., the
ones that do not send the manuscript for review or that
accept it even with low-quality/unreliable reviews with
the only goal to charge fees). Moreover, while many re-
searchers are in favor of opening reviews, opening iden-
tities is seen as potentially dangerous, fearing that by
disclosing names the reviewers might be incentivized to
weaken criticisms or authors might be incentivized to re-
taliate against them (Ross-Hellauer et al., 2017). Never-
theless, the British Medical Journal reported that open-
ing reviews and reviewers’ identities, simultaneously, did
not change the quality of the peer reviews, suggest-
ing that reviewers were not intimidated (van Rooyen
et al., 2010). Therefore, a good trade-off might be to
open reviews while asking to opt-in for open identi-
ties: anonymity, in fact, does not compromise the pro-
cess (Bravo et al., 2019) and might avoid unfair use in
eLife (2011), F1000 Research (2012), PeerJ (2013) and Nature
Communications (2016)
5 https://elifesciences.org/inside-elife/262c4c71/
peer-review-first-results-from-a-trial-at-elife
6 https://www.wiley.com/network/
researchers/being-a-peer-reviewer/
transparent-review-at-the-european-journal-of-neuroscience-experiences-one-year-on
7 https://reimaginereview.asapbio.org/
4subsequent evaluation of the authors for grants, jobs,
awards or promotions. According to a recent research,
the potential benefits of published reviews are multi-
ple (Polka et al., 2018), from encouraging constructive
comments and training examples for young researchers8
to preserving arguments and ideas that characterize how
fields evolve, from building trust based on transparency
to recognizing the important work done by reviewers.
Several journals and platforms are in the process of
adopting these principles one way or another. Pubpeer
is a platform dedicated to the discussion of papers follow-
ing their publication in a journal or as preprints. Even
though the majority of comments address the (still very
important) problem of scientific misconduct and major
issues changing the conclusions of the studies, there is
space for costructive discussions between authors and
readers, and even public reviews of preprints. This as-
pect is crucial and several journals (including major out-
lets such as PLOS and ELife) are now embracing com-
ments on papers submitted to the journals and posted as
preprints, and including them in the process of editorial
evaluation. Platforms of preprint and open reviews can
also serve the purpose of overlay journals, which include
papers already made public, commented and revised, in
collections curated by the editorial board.
Other approaches aim at decoupling the function of
journals (most importantly, dissemination) from the cer-
tification provided by peer review. Several platforms,
such as the Peerage of Science9 or RUBRIQ10, offer peer-
review services and then forward revised manuscript to
journals, in exchange of some fee or for free. Other plat-
forms, such as F1000Research11, combine a open peer-
review system with publication services, without edito-
rial bias. However, the major limitation of these decou-
pled approaches is the lack of engagement of reviewers
involved in the process, that can eventually lead to the
failure of such initiatives. As we will show in the fol-
lowing, we argue that principles for a open, transparent
peer-review process can work better if anchored to a solid
reputation system, by which participants in the system
are both rewarded and responsibilized.
C. Aims of PRINCIPIA
PRINCIPIA aims at improving the current peer-review
system in the following aspects:
1. Referees are remunerated.
8 https://www.elsevier.com/editors-update/story/peer-
review/pilot-designed-to-help-reviewers-win-recognition-for-
their-work-leads-to-better-quality-reviews,-say-editors
9 peerageofscience.org
10 rubriq.com
11 https://f1000research.com/
2. Remuneration of referees depends on the quality of
their reviews.
3. New journals are easy and free to start.
4. A new journal inherits the reputation of its
founders (i.e. editorial board).
5. All journals are open access and cost-effective.
Point 1. and 2. will restore a balance of power between
researchers and publishers while guaranteeing a improved
quality and fairness of reviews. Point 3., 4. will increase
the offer and flexibility of the journal landscape by mak-
ing it extremely easy to bootstrap a new journal. Finally,
point 5. guarantees a lower entry barrier both for authors
aiming to publish in a journal and to scientists interested
in accessing published papers.
II. THE PEER-REVIEW MARKET
Every person using PRINCIPIA is uniquely identified
by its RSA-4096 public key.
Any group of people can join and form a journal by
serving as member of the editorial board. Thus, in PRIN-
CIPIA a journal is identified by a collection of public
keys. The editorial board has the following roles:
• It reviews the paper submitted to the journal and
decide whether a paper should be accepted or not
• It decides whether other people should be allowed
to join the editorial board
• It sets the rules of the journal (see Section III.B)
These actions are performed using the consensus rules
explained in Section IV.
The PRINCIPIA framework assigns a reputation score
to a journal according to the people participating to the
editorial board. The mechanism is explained in section
V.
In order to submit a paper to a journal the authors
must publish it (see Section VII for details on the pos-
sible implementation). Then they perform a request of
publication to the journal by attaching the hash of their
paper and a bid for a review fee. The editorial board will
vote using the consensus mechanism explained in Section
IV.C and decide whether to accept the bid and consider
the paper for review. If the vote is positive then a set of
reviewers is randomly generated from the people in the
editorial board. The reviewers will perform their review
and publish it. According to the rules explained in Sec-
tion IV.D the paper will be accepted or rejected. After
the authors have received the written reviews they will
write the final version, publish it and submit it again to
the same reviewers for a final acceptance vote. The re-
view fee will be split between the journal’s fee and an
5amount that will be distributed to the referees according
to the mechanism awarding the good reviews explained
in Section IV.E.
A. Differences with the current peer-review system
There are many substantial differences between the
current peer review system and PRINCIPIA. A journal in
PRINCIPIA is uniquely identified by its editorial board.
This creates a liquid system in which the reputation of
a publication is identified by who was serving as edito-
rial board in the moment of the publication. This is
more flexible than the current system in which a jour-
nal’s reputation is identified by its history and will help
new quality journal to be created more easily since it
will reduce the difficulties to bootstrap a journal’s repu-
tation. Of course established journal with a strong brand
can participate to PRINCIPIA and their reputation will
still be recognized outside of PRINCIPIA’s system. On
the other hand, inside the system their reputation will be
based just on their editorial board’s reputation, exactly
as for any other journal.
Another remarkable difference with the current system
is that referees will not work for free. They will receive
part of the review fee for the work they performed by re-
viewing the paper. Moreover they will be incentivized by
writing detailed and high quality reviews by the system
explained in Section IV.E.
In PRINCIPIA the equilibrium between authors and
journals is re-established. In fact, while authors can look
for the most suitable journals to publish their work, we
envision a system where journals bid on papers to at-
tract those authors of (initially perceived) high quality
scientific products.
B. Fee market
In PRINCIPIA fees are not fixed and are instead de-
cided by the market. There are two kind of fees: the
review fee which is bid by authors to have their paper
reviewed by a journal, and a joining fee which is bid by
a person to join the editorial board of a journal.
Authors will have to bid a review fee in order to have
their paper reviewed by a journal. This is different from
the current system in which fees are paid just in case
the paper gets published and the publication fee is fixed.
By moving the payment at a review level we think au-
thors will be incentivized to just submit papers on which
they have enough confidence. Moreover this will discour-
age journals to accept as many papers as possible just to
collect the publication fees. We believe this system will
increase the quality of the work submitted and will free
the reviewers from reviewing many low quality papers.
Morover paying for reviews instead of paying for publi-
cations allows to allocate a payment to the stage where
most of the work is performed (in fact the publication
of a paper, after it has been reviewed, has a low cost
compared to to cost of performing the review).
Keeping the review fee variable and assigned through
a bid creates a market in which journal competes for the
best papers. An author might propose the same quality
paper to few journals and eventually decide to submit it
to the journal that allows him to bid the lowest review
fee (or which would even pay him to review to have the
chance to review the paper). Of course this also open to
the possibility for a low quality paper to be accepted for
review because the authors have bid an high review fee.
This is possible, but disincentivized as being accepted
for review does not guarantee publication. In fact if the
paper is not good, the editorial board will not be incen-
tivized to accept it for publication as it would reduce the
reputation of the journal (see Section V).
A similar situation happens with the fee to join a jour-
nal as editorial board member. On one hand journals
migh be tempted to accept in the editorial board some-
body with a bad reputation if he/she bids an high joining
fee. On the other hand the reputation system will disin-
centivize those behaviours. Of course having a market-
based joining fee will allow journal to compete for the
best people to join the program committe. A person with
low reputation might have to pay to join a good journal,
but a person with high reputation might instead end up
being paid to join the program committe of a journal.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section we describe in details the entity of the
PRINCIPIA framework
A. Person
A person in PRINCIPIA is a public key (ppk). Because
of the reputation system we will explain in section V, it is
very important that each public key is strongly connected
to a real person. Therefore keys need to be validated by
reliable institutions, similarly to what happens in digital
signature released by governments.
B. Journal
A journal is a collection of public keys, a reference to
its ancestor journal and the value of its parameters. The
parameters of a journal are the following:
• Percentage of review fee to keep in the journal (fj)
• Whether reviewers should be anonymous or not
(aj)
6JOURNAL
JOURNAL_HASH: 32A...134
JOURNAL_SCORE: 10
JOURNAL
JOURNAL_HASH: 12B...1A3
JOURNAL_SCORE: 5
PROGRAM_COMMITEE_SCOR
E: MEAN(6.66, 1.14, 7.25) = 5
Spent 6 month in the editorial board
Spent 1
0 month
s in the 
editoria
l board
PERSON
USER_SCORE = 10/18 + 5/18 = 6.66
PERSON
USER_SCORE = 1.14
PERSON
USER_SCORE = 7.25
Figure 1 Schematic illustration of the interplay between journals and actors in PRINCIPIA.
• Maximum time to perform a review (tj)
• Number of reviewers for each paper (nj)
• Size of the qualified majority needed to accept a
paper for review (rj)
• Size of the qualified majority needed to spend the
journal’s balance. (pj)
• Size of the qualified majority needed to modify the
journal (mj) [this must be higher than pj ]
When a journal is created it requires the signature of
all the members of the editorial board.
Any of the element of the journal can be changed by
creating a new journal and setting the old journal as its
ancestor journal. In order for the creation of a new jour-
nal to be valid, the signature of a certain amount of mem-
bers of the ancestor journal should be present according
to the rules described in Section IV. This means that any
change of the journal parameters or to the journal’s edi-
torial board triggers the creation of a new journal. It is
not possible to publish on an ancestor journal, but the
old publication will still be connected to the old journal.
This way each publication is always connected to the sta-
tus of the journal at the moment of the publication.
Each journal has a journal balance consisting on the
funds from the review fees, excluding the part which goes
to the reviewers. The balance can be spent to cover the
expenses of the journal (e.g advertisement or to ask a per-
son to join the journal). Spending the funds of the jour-
nal’s wallet requires the signatures of a qualified majority
of the editorial board (specified by the journal’s param-
eter pj). Since the majority needed to spend the journal
balance is lower than the majority needed to modify a
journal, every time a new journal is created, the balance
of the journal wallet of its ancestor can (and should) be
transfered to the wallet of the new journal. See Fig. 1 for
a schematic illustration.
C. Paper
A papers is a published document (see Section VII for
details on possible implementation) identified by its hash
and signed by the authors. Review and publication of a
paper goes through the procedure explained in section
IV
7PERSON
Bid to join joining fee bid: 2 ETH
JOURNAL
JOURNAL_HASH: 32A...134
JOURNAL_BALANCE: 142 ETH
JOURNAL
JOURNAL_HASH: 14D...1A3
ANCESTOR_HASH: 32A...134
JOURNAL_BALANCE: 144 ETH
Joining bid returned and the
person does not join the
journal.
Journal
decides not accept
the new member
Vote on whether to
accept the bid to join.
Requires a qualified
majority
Journal decieds
to accept
the new member
A new journal is generated with
the new member of the
editorial board in and a new
balance.
Figure 2 Schematic illustration of the process to extend an existing editorial board in PRINCIPIA.
IV. CONSENSUS
A. Modifying a journal
A modification of a journal triggers the creation of a
new journal which has as ancestor the old journal (as de-
scribed in Section III.B). Modifications are approved by
a qualified majority defined as a journal parameter mj .
Adding or removing a person to the editorial board is
a modification to a journal. Changing one of the jour-
nal’s parameters (for example the number of reviewers
for each paper) is also a modification to a journal. The
only journal modification which does not require a qual-
ified majority is when a member of the editorial board
decides to leave the journal, this can be done unilaterally
without any approval from the journal. See Fig. 2 for a
schematic illustration of this process.
B. Joining a journal
In order for a person to join a journal it needs to bid a
joining fee. This will trigger a journal modification event
that needs to be approved by a qualified majority (mj)
of the journal. The amount bid will be deposited to the
journal’s wallet in case the person is allowed to join the
journal, otherwise the amount is returned to the bidder.
C. Accepting a paper for review
A person can ask a journal to review its paper by bid-
ding a review fee. A paper is accepted for review by a
qualified majority defined as a journal parameter rj . If
the paper is accepted for review, and the authors confirm
he wants to proceed with the review, then nj reviewers
are selected at random and they will review the paper. In
case the journal want to keep the identity of the review-
ers anonymous (as of the parameter aj), a system based
on ring signature will be used to assign the reviewers.
D. Deciding whether a paper should be published
Each reviewer will review the paper and assign a score
su between 1 and 5. If the average score s is greater than
3 then the paper is accepted for publication.
8IPFS
IPFS
AUTHOR
PUB_KEY: A32...412
JOURNAL
JOURNAL_HASH: 32A...134
Vote on whether to accept
the bid and review the paper
Bid rejected Bid acceptedBid returned to
author
A random set of
reviewers is
selected from
the program
commitee
Outcome of
reviews is
uploaded on IPFS
Unreviewed paper uploaded on IPFS
UNREVIEWD PAPER
HASH: 5D...12
Review fee is split
between journal and
reviewers
Author reads the reviews
and prepares the final version   Paper accepted
REVIEWS FOR PAPER
5D...12
Paper not
published. Review
fee not returned
Paper
rejectedFinal version according to reviews
submitted for publication
Journal accepts
the final version
FINAL VERSION 
HASH: AA2...431
AUTHOR: A32...412
JOURNAL: 32A...134
Final version
published on IPFS
AUTHOR
PUB_KEY: A32...412
JOURNAL
JOURNAL_HASH: 32A...134
Bid to publish paper_hash: 5d...12
review_fee bid: 0.5 ETH
Figure 3 Schematic illustration of the review process leading to paper acceptance/rejection and reward for the reviewers in
PRINCIPIA.
E. How to split he review fee between reviewers
The review split is divided in this way:
• fj percentage goes to the journal’s wallet
• The remaining is split between each reviewer u.
Each reviewers receive an amount of funds equalt to
9ru where ru is calculated using the following equa-
tion ru = fr · (1− fj) ·
(
1
2
|su−3|∑
u |su−3| −
1
2
|su−s|∑
u |su−s|
)
The idea is to reward "consensus", i.e. to reward re-
viewers that agrees with the average score of the other
reviewers, while at the same time discourage scores close
to the 3 and forcing reviewers to take a position.
An illustration of the overall process is shown in Fig. 3.
V. REPUTATION SYSTEM
Each user in PRINCIPIA has a reputation score which
depends on journal in which he/she served as member of
the editorial board. At the same time each journal has
a reputation score which depends on the impact of the
research it published. Since a modification to a journal
(including change in the editorial board) triggers the cre-
ation of a new journal, which will therefore have a score
that does not depends on its ancestor journal, we also
define a reputation score for the editorial board, which
will be the main score to judge the quality of a journal.
A. Journal score
The journal’s score is inspired to the weighted impact
factor described in (Alguliyev et al., 2015). The score
is calculated as the number of citations of all the papers
published in that journal divided by the number of papers
published by the journal. The number of citations is
weighted by the editorial board score (see Section V.C)
of journals who published the citing papers.
Notice that a modification of the paper triggers the
creation of a new journal (see Section III.B) so this score
takes into account just the papers published in the jour-
nal, ignoring the ancestor and descendant journals. Also
notice that the weight is calculated using the editorial
boarde score, rather than the journal’s score.
B. User score
The score of a user serving as reviewer is calculated as
the weighted average of the journal’s score of the jour-
nal in which he or she served as member of the edito-
rial board. The average is weighted by the time he or
she spent in the committee. So for example a user who
served 6 months in a journal having journal score of 10
and 12 months in a journal having score 5, will have a
score of 618 · 10 + 1218 · 5 = 6.66
C. Editorial board score
The editorial board score is a score assigned to the
editorial board of a journal. It is the main score to judge
the quality of a journal. It is calculated as the average
score of the users serving in the editorial board.
D. Incentives/disincentives of the reputation system
This reputation system gives reputation to the users
according to the reputation of the journal in which they
served as editorial board. This incentivize users to join
journal with an high reputation.
At the same time the reputation of a journal depends
on the impact of the paper published, which should en-
courage a journal to publish good quality papers.
The reputation of a user does not depend on the paper
he/she published as an author. PRINCIPIA untight the
reputation of a person as an author from their reputation
as a reviewer. We want to focus on improving the peer
review system and reward users who can discern high
quality papers from low quality ones. We believe this is
what makes a person a good editorial board member and
we want the system to create a race between journals to
get the best of them. We believe this will increase the
quality of the work published.
VI. A MINIMAL DECENTRALIZED PEER-REVIEW
SYSTEM
While journals are pivotal actors of the peer-review
ecosystem and need to be part of it, it might be dif-
ficult to include them in the PRINCIPIA at the begin-
ning. Therefore, one might consider a two-step process in
which i) the peer-review system is decentralized, and ii)
new journals are created. In this Section, we propose an
alternative decentralized peer-review system fully com-
patible with PRINCIPIA, without including the forma-
tion of new journals.
A. System Architecture
The architecture of the system is similar to the one pro-
posed in Section III. Each person (scientists) in PRIN-
CIPIA is a public key. Each scientist in the peer-review
process can have one of two roles: author of the paper
submitted for review or reviewer of that paper.
Each scientist i has associated a few keywords indicat-
ing their expertise, a reputation score RSi, and a review
fee Ri. The keywords of each scientist are initially val-
idated by their publication record and updated on the
basis of the papers reviewed. The RS is initially equal
for everyone and completely independent by the scien-
tist’s publication record. The review fee Ri of scientist
i is the price they ask to perform a review. It will be
dependent on their RSi (see Section VI.B): the higher
RSi, the higher Ri fees can be asked.
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A papers is a document identified by its hash and
signed by the authors. Authors submit a paper to the
peer-review system with associated keywords indicating
the field, by bidding a paper review fee Rp.
B. Peer-review process
Once a paper is submitted, the system tries to assign
the paper to potential reviewers, by matching the Rp bid
by the authors with the review fees asked in the market
by scientists with respect to the paper’s field (i.e. also
matching paper’s keywords with potential reviewers’ key-
words). That is, the system tries to solve the equation∑n
i=1Ri ' Rp by choosing a pool of n > 3 reviewers.
These reviewers are also chosen in order to have mixed
RS, compatibly with the Rp bid by the authors. The sys-
tem also limits the maximum number of reviews assigned
to each scientists, to avoid excessive burden to single re-
viewers and to avoid reviewers asking low R fees to get
too many reviews. If a match is possible, the paper is
accepted for review and assigned to the reviewers.
The peer-review process proceeds as it follows: In step
1, selected reviewers perform review independently and
assign the paper a score, representing its quality. In step
2, selected reviewers read the reports of other reviewers
and assign them a score, judging the quality of the re-
ports. For each reviewer i, its average report score is
computed. If it is above a certain threshold, the reviewer
collects the Ri fee asked. If not, that Ri fee is returned to
the paper’s authors. In this way, there are no incentives
to give low or high scores to reports of other reviewers
to collect their fees. Then, the reputation score RS of
each reviewer is updated with the average score obtained
by their report. In this way, reviewers have incentives to
produce high-quality reports, see Section VI.C. Note that
step 2 is a further burden for reviewers with respect to
the current peer-review process, but relatively light since
reviewers have already reviewed the paper in step 1 and
so they can easily judge other report’s quality.
Once step 2 is concluded, the average peer-review score
of the paper Sp is computed. If it is above a certain
threshold, which can be different for different fields, the
paper is accepted by the system as “peer-reviewed”. Oth-
erwise it is withdraw and disappears. Further interac-
tions among the authors and the reviewers could be con-
sidered, as in the current peer-review process, to achieve
consensus, if necessary.
Once a paper is accepted by the system, it becomes
public together with its associated score Sp, the (anony-
mous) reports, the scores assigned to each report indi-
cating its quality, and the reputation score RS of the
n reviewers. These elements (paper’s score, reports, re-
ports’ scores, and reputation scores of reviewers) certify
the quality of the paper. At this point, authors can sub-
mit the paper for publication to journals and journals
can bid to publish papers they found interesting, based
on the quality of the paper certified by the peer-review
system. The authors can also decide to leave the paper
in the system and not to publish it in any journal.
C. Reputation system and incentives
The RS of each scientist is at the core of the peer-
review system. It represents their prestige as a reviewer,
in the same way the h-index or number of citation might
represent their prestige as an author. Note that these
two quantities are completely independent.
Scientists have the incentive to increase their RS in or-
der to ask higher R fees, see below. As described in Sec-
tion VI.B, the RS increases for each review performed by
the average score collected by the report of the reviewer.
Therefore, reviewers have two incentives to produce high-
quality reports: i) to collect the R fee (which is not payed
for low-quality reports), and ii) to obtain high scores and
increase their RS. These incentives are expected to solve
one of the most important problems of the current peer-
review system, low-quality reports.
Coherently with PRINCIPIA, the R fees and Rp bids
are not fixed but decided by the market, that is, reviewers
(authors) can ask (bid) whatever fee they like. The peer-
review system is an actual market that matches the de-
mand from peer-review service from authors to the sup-
ply of peer-review service provided by reviewers.
Reviewers have the incentive to perform reviews to in-
crease their RS. In order to obtain papers for review,
they have the incentive to ask low R fees to be easily
matched with the Rp fees offered by a paper’s authors.
Note that the matching is crucially dependent on the
RS of reviewers: if the R fee asked by a reviewer is not
aligned with their RS, they do not obtain any paper to
review. Therefore, reviewers have the incentive to ask a
R fee aligned with their RS. Once their RS increases,
they can ask for higher R fees. Note that the system
limits the maximum number of reviews for scientist, so
none has incentives to ask too low R fees. To sum up,
reviewers will ask a R fee determined by the market for
their RS and field of expertise (associated keywords). A
R fee asked higher than the market value would not get
any paper to review.
At the same time, authors have the incentive to bid
high Rp fee to attract reviewers with high RS, who can
charge high R fees. However, note that this does not
guarantee a positive peer-review outcome, with a good
paper’s score. Again, authors will bid a Rp fee deter-
mined by the market, depending on the quality of the
reviewers they want, certified by the RS of the review-
ers. A Rp fee bid lower than the market value would not
obtain any reviewer.
To help the matching process, the system can suggest
a “fair" Rp bid to associate to the paper in order to secure
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reviewers, based on the currentR fees asked in the market
for the paper’s specific field.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION AS A BLOCKCHAIN-POWERED
SOLUTION
Implementating PRINCIPIA requires a solution to the
following issues:
• How to process the payments for fees (review fee
and journal joining fee)
• Where to store papers and reviews
• How to implement and where to run the implemen-
tation of the protocol
A possible solution would be to set up a no-profit foun-
dation which would handle all the aspects above. The
foundation would develop the code, host the platform,
deal with the storage of papers and review and process
all the payments in the main currencies. This would be
similar to the model behind Wikipedia.
Such a centralized approach will expose non-trivial fi-
nancial problems as the foundation would have to process
large amount of money in fees. Morover having the whole
academic publishing system in the hand of a foundation
might lead to conflicts of interest in the way the founda-
tion is managed which might lead to censorship, sabotage
and lack of transparency.
We think that PRINCIPIA would benefit from an im-
plementation running on platform enabling smart con-
tracts, like for example Ethereum 12 and from using a
decentralized storage to store papers and reviews, for ex-
ample IPFS (Benet, 2014), a peer to peer distributed
storage system in which files are identified and retrieved
by hash
If the protocol is implemented using smart contracts
on Ethereum, all the payments can be automatically pro-
cessed using any token supported by the Ethereum plat-
form (including Ether) so the foundation would not have
to deal with processing the payments. Moreover the pro-
cess would be completely transparent as the code of the
smart contracts could be inspected and all the steps of
the protocol would be public and indefinitely stored on
the blockchain.
Using IPFS for storage would allow to cut down the
cost of storage and lead to a system which is more cen-
sorship resistant compared to a centralized approach.
With a blockchain-based solution a foundation would
still be needed in order to fund the development of the
system and support institutions in starting to adopt the
use of PRINCIPIA. On the other hand on the long term
12 https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper
the foundation would have no control on the system
therefore avoiding centralization of power and conflict of
interests.
Blockchain solutions also come with drawbacks, e.g.
performance, cost of development and flexibility 13.
Blockchain should be used just when specific trust issues
need to be addressed. We envision PRINCIPIA becom-
ing the system on which the whole peer review system
can take place, therefore we think the additional com-
plexity which a blockchain-solution would bring is bal-
anced off by the system becoming censorship resistant,
permissionless, transparent and decentralized.
According to a recent report (Science and van Rossum,
2017), some of the most prominent issues currently faced
by scholarly communication – e.g., costs, openness, and
universal accessibility to scientific information – might be
solved by adequate processes based on blockchain. In fact
a number of different blockchain-based for peer reviews
have been proposed recently.
Pluto networks 14 aims at providing an ecosystem in
which research can be published and reviewed. Papers
can be published by any actor in the system, and jour-
nals do not exist. We think this process has limitations
as it opens up to the possibility for a reviewer to review
a work outside of her expertise. Moreover removing com-
pletely the concept of journal would not allow the current
editors to participate in the system, leading to difficulties
in bootstrapping the system.
ScienceRoot 15 aims at defining a system for research
funding and publications based on blockchain. While
having some elements in common with PRINCIPIA, Sci-
enceRoot does not tackle some of the problems which
PRINCIPIA aims at solving. There isn’t a reputation
system so the problem of concentration of powers in few
journal is not solved. Moreover ScienceRoot lack a sys-
tem of incentives to incentives good reviews and the cre-
ation of good journals.
Blockchain For Peer Review 16 is also developing a
blockchain-based system for peer review. Also this sys-
tem does not tackle all the problems PRINCIPIA is aim-
ing to solve, for example there isn’t a liquid reputation
system, and the system is also lacking a process for renu-
merating reviewers.
Ledger Journal 17 is a peer-reviewed journal which
publish research articles on the subjects of cryptocur-
rency. Ledger is not aiming at replacing the whole peer
review system, despite that it contains some interesting
elements which are including in PRINCIPIA as well. For
13 https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.13093
14 https://pluto.network/
15 www.scienceroot.com
16 https://www.blockchainpeerreview.org/2019/03/
a-deeper-dive-into-our-proof-of-concept/
17 https://ledgerjournal.org/ojs/index.php/ledger
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example papers are digitally signed by the author and
publication timestamp is published on blockchain. More-
over reviews are published together with the paper.
PROBO (Furlanello et al., 2017) is a blockchain-based
solution to the issue of reproducible data analysis. Sim-
ilarly to ScienceRoot and PLUTO, PROBO does not
provide for a system of incentives/disincentives to award
good behaviour.
Some criticism on using blockchain to improve the sci-
entific process are discussed in (Extance, 2017). The
work is mainly critical on using blockchain to store and
collect data as “Costs in research applications would in-
crease faster than it does for cryptocurrencies because
modern science produces far more data.“. PRINCIPIA
does not aim at publishing any data on the blockchain
as it focus only on providing a system for transparent
peer review. Storage on blockchain is extremely expen-
sive and PRINCIPIA will store on the blockchain only
the outcome of reviews and all the transactions. The re-
views itself and the papers will be stored on a distributed
storage system therefore the cost of maintaining the sys-
tem can be limited. In PRINCIPIA the cost for publish-
ing increase only if the number of submission increases
more than the number of reviewers. Since part of the
review fee will go to reviewers this will incentivize more
reviewers to join the system when the cost of reviewing
increases, therefore re-balancing the demand and offer in
a way similar to the dynamic pricing system used in the
sharing economy applications (Uber, Airbnb, Deliveroo,
...) The article also suggest the use of a private permis-
sioned blockchain to reduce costs and power consump-
tion. This is a problem that does not concern specific
applications but it is rather a tradeoff between security
and power consumption which affect most of the current
blockchain implementations and it is out of the scope of
this paper. Private blockchains do not solve entirely the
problem of trust and therefore are not a viable solution
for the implementation of a system like PRINCIPIA. The
article also mention the problem of immutability of stor-
age as what is published on the distributed storage can-
not be deleted. This can be problematic when sensible
data is published, which is not the case of PRINCIPIA
as only reviews outcomes and transactions will be stored
on the distributed storage.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
The public debate around the peer-review system
thrives, spurring a plethora of new proposals to improve
the current model and overcome its limitations. Inter-
estingly, some of these proposals are implemented by
blockchain technology 18, as we suggest here. Far from
covering the extensive, fast-growing literature in the field,
this white paper presents a novel framework for peer-
review, open to contribution from all key players of the
scientific ecosystem. Our proposal is built around few
principles aimed at creating a market for peer-review ser-
vices and publications. PRINCIPIA allows reviewers to
be rewarded, thus improving the quality of their reviews,
and opens the publishing market by lowering entry bar-
riers. While we solidify these principles in a coherent
architecture, the details of such implementation remain
open for discussion.
We propose two different yet partially compatible im-
plementation of PRINCIPIA, a whole system including
a detailed description of how new, liquid journals work,
and a minimal implementation of the peer-review system
independent by the creation of new journals. Both pro-
posals are built around two key ingredients: an intrinsic
reputation system and a decentralized market for peer-
review services. These ingredients are aimed at over-
coming the main limitations of the current system, as
well as potential limitations of other frameworks. As dis-
cussed in the introduction, indeed, several proposals in-
clude – at least partially – the principles presented here,
in particular the idea of a transparent, open peer-review
system. While some are thriving, others, such as Axios
Review, failed due to a lack of engagement of scientists
involved in the peer-review process. We believe that the
intrinsic reputation system proposed here, which reward
and responsibilize reviewers, can engage scientists in join-
ing PRINCIPIA. In the long term, the reputation gained
through reviews could form part of the overall reputation
of a scientists, in the same way citations are related to
reputation as an author.
The creation of a market for peer-review, on the other
hand, will incentivize i) reviewers to improve the quality
of their reports, being rewarded for it, and ii) authors to
judge the quality of their papers by bidding an appro-
priate review fees. This is another interesting difference
with respect to the current system, where the rational
for authors is always to submit a paper to journals with
the highest reputation, since fees are asked only in case
of acceptance, while peer-review process is not paid – at
least in the majority of STEM-related journals.
The two proposed architectures implement these in-
gredients in slightly different ways, each one with its own
strengths and limitations. The whole system including
journals anchors the reputation of users to the reputa-
tion of journals they serve, which in turns depends on
the citations collected by papers published on such jour-
nals. Therefore, the reputation of a user is ultimately
18 https://github.com/aletheia-foundation/
aletheia-whitepaper/blob/master/WHITE-PAPER.md#
a-blockchain-journal
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dependant on the quality of papers published in the jour-
nal they serve. This mechanism is similar to the current
system in principle, while the differences root in the fact
that journals are now liquid and much more easy to start.
Therefore, it is expected that the journal market, where
users are free to join and leave journals at any time, stim-
ulates users to join journals offering better peer-review
service, which will thus attract better paper, ultimately
increasing the reputation of users joining them.
In the minimal version of PRINCIPIA independent by
the creation of new journals, on the contrary, the rep-
utation system is endogenous to the peer-review market
and thus completely independent by the quality of papers
published, depending only on the quality of the reviews.
On the one hand, this endogenous mechanism is at risk
of being self-referential, based on the fact that review-
ers assign fair scores to the reports of their colleagues.
This is however the same principle of peer-review itself,
reviewers are trusted to fairly evaluate papers. On the
other hand, the fact that the reputation score of users is
directly related to the quality of their reports incentives
the production of high-quality reports.
The functioning of the peer-review market is also dif-
ferent between the two proposals. While in both cases
authors are encouraged to bid a review fee depending
on the quality of their paper, the mechanisms ensuring
this incentive are slightly different. In the whole system
including journals, authors submit their papers to jour-
nals, thus the review fee offered must be aligned to the
reputation of the journal. A possible limitation here is
the incentive for journals to accept many submission to
collect the review fee (since this is not refunded in case
of rejection), and then publish only good papers, to keep
a high reputation.
In the minimal peer-review market, on the contrary,
authors submit papers directly to the market, thus the
quality of the reviewers secured (determined by their rep-
utation score) directly depends on the review fee offered.
The proposal for a minimal peer-review system stems
from the fact that the whole system including journals
requires first scientists to create journals, and second the
peer-review market to start, since reviewers are chosen
among the editorial board of journals. Therefore, the
creation of a journal market precedes – at least concep-
tually – the creation of the peer-review system. This is
a possible limitation, since in order to join journals users
need to bid a journal fee. This can be seen as an in-
vestment: the higher the journal fee offered, the better
the journal joined and thus higher review fees are col-
lected in the future as a member of the editorial board
(when acting as a reviewer). Therefore, the process of
creating new, liquid journals through the journal market
could be slow, also because being part of the editorial
board of a journal requires additional work with respect
to peer-review (accepting/declining papers and potential
new members).
A possible solution that combines the two proposal is
to start first the minimal version of the peer-review sys-
tem, then once reputation scores of scientists start to in-
crease and diversify, liquid journals can be created by sci-
entists bidding their reputation score. In this way, good
reviewers would join and form high-quality journals.
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